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Po1Dt No. 2 !he trial court 414 not .-r in
enter1ag ttndings ot tact !loa. 4, and I
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prerequl.aite to re1ns1atemer.lt ot the
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that aaid requir·•eta were wa1ved.
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OF THE

State of Utah

ETHEL LOUISE GREGERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation.
Defendant and .Appellant.

Case

No. 7674

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has fairly stated the facts, although we
should like to make this addition: (a) It was stipulated
by counsel (R. 12) that when the new policy was issued
on June 1, 1947, the old policy had been in effect since
Octoher 3, 1940.

1
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
Respondent's Points are the exact opposite of Appellant's Points, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, namely, that the Court was
correct in its rulings with respect to them.
ARGUMENT

1.
It is the position of the respondent, that in consideration of the long duration of the prior term policy no
physical examination of the insured was required either
at the beginning or reinstatement of the present policy,
as to any amount up to $3,000.00.
We invite the Court's scrutiny of the policy (Exhibit
"A") itself: On page 3 reference is made to an old
policy (which it was stipulated had been in effect since
October 3, 1940, a period of more than six years and
seven months). This policy goes on to say:
"Whereas Grant Gregerson the above (insured) has for a period of 1nore than six months
immediately last past been insured under a policy
in the Mountain States Insurance Company; and
"Whereas, all of the premiums due on said
policy for a period of six months or more immediately prior to the date hereof have been paid
before the same became delinquent;
"Now, Therefore, in consideration of the
premises, it is here by agreed that the penal ties
contained in the commuted benefits provisions of
this policy are hereby waived as to the said Grant
Gregerson to the extent of the principal amount
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of the poliey heretofore in force upon the life of
said insured, to \Yi t : the sum of $3,000.00."
Now, if the Court \Yill turn to page 2 of the policy,
it \Yill see "'"hat ''penalties" are waived by the foregoing.
We quote:
·

"Comrnuted Benefits. (a) If the application
of this poliy is accepted and a Policy issued without a satisfactory Medical Examiner's Report as
a condition precedent to the taking effect of this
Policy, the Insured 1nust be in good and vigorous
health and free from all bodily ailments and
disease at the date of issue and delivery of this
Policy or at the date of reinstatement after any
lapse thereof. Otherwise, any benefits accruing
under this Policy are hereby forfeited and the
Company is relieved of all liability hereunder."
What was the penalty waived~ It was the liability
to take a physical examination and to be "free from all bodily ailments and disease" at the date of the policy
or its reinstatement. That is our case; and it were almost
supererogatory to go further. S·uch was the contract, an
ordinary and common one, we take it, in the conversion
of a term to a permanent life policy.
The application, physical examination, indeed all
the appellant says, would be pertinent, indeed, if this
policy were for more than the old one; but it is not-it
is for the identical amount, $3,000.00.
That the Company itself so regarded it is apparent
from the fact, that there is no evidence whatever that
the insured was either invited or required to appear

3
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before a Company doctor for physical examination at
the date of this policy.
, It is conceded by appellant that the rule of strictissimi juris applies to insurance policies, to protect the
public. In the apt language of this Court (Handley v.
Mutual L. Ins., Co., 106 Utah 184, 147 P. 2d 319) it
applies especially
"in the case of contracts which are sold
widely to the average man under sales talk which
cannot be too technical in its expositions and yet
which very easily lull him into a belief that he
has purchased certain benefits which on closer
scrutiny of the contract are asserted not to be
included."
There is, however, no need to apply that rule here.
Please reread the waiver supra. There is no ambiguity;
there is nothing it could possibly refer to except physical
condition and examination, the penalty listed under Commuted Benefits; and certainly the liability to physical
examination is a very serious penalty. On January 31,
1950, the insured had carried this policy and its predecessor for over nine years, and we may assume that,
as with all policies, a physical examination of him occurred at that early date. He could read; he could see
that this policy waived all further physical examination
up to the amount of the original policy-it said so. He
could also read in this policy under Reinstatement (Exhibit A; quoted in Appellant's Brief p. 23):
"This policy may be reinstated \Vithin thirty
days and less than six months after a lapse on
4
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pay1nent to the l~ompany of arrears of pre1niun1
'Yith interest at the rate of 5% per annum... "
,,. .hen, therefore, he on February 2, 1950, tendered
the premiun1 only t'vo days overdue (after carrying the
policy for nine years) he 'Yas justified in the belief that
the only penalty 'Yas interest on $15.69 at 5% for two
days. But no-the Company required not only the premium but a physical exa1nination, contrary to the waiver.

2.
~~courts

do not favor forfeitures, particularly
"~here they are the result of technical provisions
in insurance contracts, and forfeitures are never
permitted unless the right thereto is clearly established." 45 C.J.S. 150 Citing many cases.
It is interesting to note that appellant claims the
waiver referred only to a reduction of benefits. As the
lower Court said in effect to appellant's counsel at the
trial: "You will talk a long time before you convince me
that the liability to physical examination is a benefit-it
"Tas the very 'penalty' waived by the waiver."

3.
The Company by its own act imposed an illegal
condition to its acceptance of a premium for re-instatement, hence it cannot now complain that such premium
was not paid.
"Payment or tender of payment may be
excused 'vhere, before the time therefor, if the
Company has repudiated the contract, or by a

5
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claim or forfeiture or otherwise has indicated that
the tender would be of no avail." 45 C.J.S. 190.
Cases cited.
llere the Company imposed the condition of a new
physical examination, which it had no right to demand.

4.
This policy, dated June 1, 1947, was written after
the present Utah Insurance law became effective. The
law (Chap. 63, Laws of Utah, 1947) was S.B. No. 34,
passed March 14, 1947, and effective May 13, 1947. This
policy, therefore, automatically became subject to two
provisions of the law, as if written into it:
(a) 43-22-1 (3)

"A provision that the policy shall be incontestable after it shall have been in force
during the lifetime of the deceased for a
period of two years from its date."
(b) 43-22-1 ( 4)

"A provision . . . . that all statements
made by the insured, shall, in the absence of
fraud, be deemed representations and not
. . . . ."
warran t 1es
The policy was dated June 1, 1947 ; the insured died
April 8, 1950; and at his death the policy had been in
e,ffect two years, ten months, or two years, seven months,
at the time of application for reinstatement. Aside from
its contractual waiver of physical examination it was
therefore incontestable for original representations
anyhow.
6
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All of appellant's argument is based on two misconceptions : (a) that the insured was required to be in
••yigorous '' health at the date of issue of the poli-cy and
(b) that a physical exa1nination was prerequisite to reinstatenlent. To grant then1 were to n1ake the waiver
1neaningless; hence, since the findings clearly set forth
the clarity of the 'vaiver, the judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

CLAUDE T. BARNES,
Attorney for Respondent.
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